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Effects of Risk on Privacy Contracts for
Demand-Side Management
Lillian J. Ratliff, Carlos Barreto, Roy Dong, Henrik Ohlsson, Alvaro A. Ca´rdenas, and S. Shankar Sastry,
Abstract—As smart meters continue to be deployed around
the world collecting unprecedented levels of fine-grained data
about consumers, we need to find mechanisms that are fair to
both, (1) the electric utility who needs the data to improve their
operations, and (2) the consumer who has a valuation of privacy
but at the same time benefits from sharing consumption data.
In this paper we address this problem by proposing privacy
contracts between electric utilities and consumers with the goal
of maximizing the social welfare of both. Our mathematical
model designs an optimization problem between a population
of users that have different valuations on privacy and the costs
of operation by the utility. We then show how contracts can
change depending on the probability of a privacy breach. This
line of research can help inform not only current but also future
smart meter collection practices.
I. INTRODUCTION
INCREASINGLY advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)is replacing older technology in the electricity grid. Smart
meters measure detailed information about consumer electric-
ity usage every half-hour, quarter-hour, or in some cases, every
five minutes. This high-granularity data is needed to support
energy efficiency efforts as well as demand-side management.
However, improper handling of this information could also
lead to unprecedented invasions of consumer privacy [1]–[4].
It has been shown that energy consumption data reveals a
considerable amount about consumer activities. Furthermore,
energy consumption data in combination with readily available
sources of information can be used to discover even more
about the consumer. Authors in [5] argue and experimentally
validate that a privacy breach can be broadly implemented in
two steps. First, energy usage data in combination with other
sensors in the home — e.g. water and gas usage — can be
used to track a person’s location, their appliance usage, and
match individuals to observed events. In the second step, this
learned information can be combined with demographic data
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— e.g. number, age, sex of individuals in the residence — to
identify activities, behaviors, etc.
Given that smart grid operations inherently have privacy and
security risks [2], it would benefit the utility company, to know
the answer to the following questions: How do consumers in
the population value privacy? How can we quantify privacy?
How do privacy-aware policies impact smart grid operations?
There have been a nuber of works making efforts to address
these questions [6]–[9]. In particular, it has been shown that
there is a fundamental utility-privacy tradeoff in data collection
policies in smart grid operations.
A utility company that desires to conduct some smart grid
operation, such as demand response or direct load control pro-
gram, requires high-fidelity data. They can observe consumers’
electricity usage but do not know their privacy preferences.
We propose that the utility company can design a screening
mechanism — in particular, a menu of contracts — to assess
how consumers value privacy.
In general, contracts are essential for realizing the benefits
of economic exchanges including those made in smart grid
operations. Contract theory has been used in energy grid
applications including procurement of electric power from a
strategic seller [10] and demand response programs [11], [12]
among others [13]. We take a novel view point by considering
privacy to be the good on which we design contracts.
We design contracts given the utility company has an
arbitrary smart grid operation they want to implement yet the
consumer’s preferences are unknown. In particular, based on
their valuation of privacy as a good, consumers can select
the quality of the service contract with the utility company.
Essentially, electricity service is offered as a product line
differentiated according to privacy where consumers can select
the level of privacy that fits their needs and wallet. The optimal
contracts are incentive compatible and individually rational.
Further, we assess loss risks due to privacy breaches given
the optimally designed contracts. We design new contracts
when these risks are explicitly considered by the utility com-
pany. We provide a characterization of the contracts designed
with and without loss risks. We show that there are inefficien-
cies when we consider losses incurred due to privacy breaches
and thus, in some cases, the utility company has an incentive
to offer compensation to the consumer in the event of a privacy
breach, invest in security measures, and purchase insurance.
The purpose of this paper is to provide qualitative as-
sessment of privacy contracts for demand-side management
through the use of simple examples which have all the
interesting properties of the larger problem such as asymmetric
information. In Section II, we study a two-type model; there
2are two types of consumers — ones that have a high valuation
of privacy and ones that have a low valuation of privacy —
and characterize the solution for the contract design problem.
In Section III, we characterize the contract solution when the
consumer is risk-adverse and the risk of a privacy breach is
explicitly modeled in the contract design. In Section IV, we
present an example where the utility company is interested
in implementing a direct load control scheme and designs
contracts with and without risk. Finally, in Section V, we
provide discussion and future research directions.
II. PRIVACY CONTRACTS
In this section, we discuss the design of privacy-based
contracts that are offered to consumers, who possess private
information, i.e., the utility does not know the characteristics
of each user. We consider a model in which there are only two
classes of users and we utilize standard results from the theory
of screening (see, e.g., [14], [15]) to develop a framework
for designing privacy contracts. In general, the fundamental
characteristics of the two-type problem extend to the any
number of types including a continuum of types.
We model privacy-settings on smart meters (e.g., sampling
rate) as a good. The quality of the good is either a high-
privacy setting xH or a low-privacy setting xL, which can
be interpreted for example as low and high sampling rates,
respectively. Each consumer selects x ∈ X = {xH ,xL} ⊂ R
where −∞ < xL < xH < ∞. On the other hand, the consumer’s
valuation of privacy is characterized by the parameter θ ,
commonly called the type of a user. The type of an agent
is seen as a piece of private information that determines the
willingness of a user to pay for a good: in our privacy setting,
the type characterizes the electricity consumption privacy
needs of the user. In our model, we assume θ takes only two
values, i.e., θ ∈ {θL,θH} ⊂ R, where θL < θH . The type θ is
distinct from the private information that is subject to a privacy
breach.
The consumers type θ is related to his willingness to pay in
the following way: if the utility company announces a price t
for choosing x, the type-dependent consumer’s utility is equal
to zero if he does not select a privacy setting x, and
ˆU(x,θ )− t ≥ 0 (1)
if he does select a privacy setting. The case in which the
consumer does not select a privacy setting is considered the
opt-out case in which consumer exercises his right to not
participate. The inequality in (1) is often called the individual
rationality constraint.
We have the following assumptions on the consumer’s utility
function which represents its preferences:
Assumption 1. The utility function ˆU : R×Θ→R is strictly
increasing in (x,θ ) ∈ R×Θ, concave in x ∈ R, and differen-
tiable with respect to x.
Assumption 2. The marginal gain from raising the value of
the privacy setting x is greater for type θH , i.e. ˆU(x,θH)−
ˆU(x,θL) is increasing in x.
Since we have only two types, the contracts offered will
be indexed by the privacy settings xL and xH . Further, as we
mentioned before, the consumer can opt-out by not selecting
a privacy option at all. Hence, we need to constrain the
mechanism design problem by enforcing the inequality given
in Equation (1) for each value of θ ∈ {θL,θH}. In addition,
we need to enforce incentive-compatibility constraints
ˆU(xH ,θH)− tH ≥ ˆU(xL,θH)− tL (2)
and
ˆU(xL,θL)− tL ≥ ˆU(xH ,θL)− tH (3)
where the first inequality says that given the price tH a
consumer of type θH should prefer the high-privacy setting
xH and the second inequality says that given the price tL a
consumer of type θL should prefer the low-privacy setting xL.
The utility company has unit utility
v(x, t) =−g(x)+ t (4)
where g : X → R is the unit cost experienced by the utility
company with a privacy setting x, which satisfies the following
assumption.
Assumption 3. The cost function g : R → R is a strictly
increasing, convex, and differentiable function.
This assumption is reasonable since a low-privacy setting
xL provides the utility company with the high-granularity data
it needs to efficiently operate and maintain the smart grid [7]–
[9].
Let the expected profit of the utility company be given by
Π(tL,xL, tH ,xH) = (1− p)v(xL, tL)+ pv(xH, tH) (5)
where p = P(θ = θH) = 1− P(θ = θL) ∈ (0,1) and P(·)
denotes probability. The screening problem is to design the
contracts, i.e. {(tL,xL),(tH ,xH)} where tL, tH ∈ R, so that the
utility companies expected profit is maximized. In particular,
to find the optimal pair of contracts, we solve the following
optimization problem:
max
{(tL,xL),(tH ,xH )}
Π(tL,xL, tH ,xH) (P-1)
s.t. ˆU(xH ,θH)− tH ≥ ˆU(xL,θH)− tL (IC-1)
ˆU(xL,θL)− tL ≥ ˆU(xH ,θL)− tH (IC-2)
ˆU(xL,θL)− tL ≥ 0 (IR-1)
ˆU(xH ,θH)− tH ≥ 0 (IR-2)
xL ≤ xH
Depending on the form of ˆU(x,θ ) and g(x) problem (P-1)
can be difficult to solve. Hence, we reduce the problem using
characteristics of the functions and constraints. We remark that
this process of reducing the constraint set in contract design
with a finite number of types is well known (see, e.g., [14]–
[16]) and sometimes referred to as the constraint reduction
theorem.
First, we show that (IR-1) is active. Indeed, suppose not.
Then, ˆU(xL,θL) − tL > 0 so that, from the first incentive
3compatibility constraint (IC-1), we have
ˆU(xH ,θH)− tH ≥ ˆU(xL,θH)− tL ≥ ˆU(xL,θL)− tL > 0 (6)
where the second to last inequality holds since ˆU(x,θ ) is
increasing in θ by assumption. As a consequence, the utility
company can increase the price for both types since neither
incentive compatibility constraint would be active. This would
lead to an increase in the utility company’s pay-off and thus,
we have a contradiction.
Now, since ˆU(xL,θL) = tL, the last inequality in (6) is equal
to zero. This implies that (IR-2) is redundant. Further, this
argument implies that the constraint (IC-1) is active. Indeed,
again suppose not. Then,
ˆU(xH ,θH)− tH > ˆU(xL,θH)− tL ≥ ˆU(xL,θL)− tL = 0 (7)
so that it would be possible for the utility company to decrease
the incentive tH without violating (IR-2).
By Assumption 2 and the fact that (IC-1) is active, we have
tH−tL = ˆU(xH ,θH)− ˆU(xL,θH)≥ ˆU(xH ,θL)− ˆU(xL,θL). (8)
This inequality implies that we can ignore (IC-2). Further,
since ˆU is increasing in (x,θ ) and by assumption θH > θL,
we have that xL < xH .
Thus, we have reduced the constraint set:
tH − tL = ˆU(xH ,θH)− ˆU(xL,θH), (9)
tL = ˆU(xL,θL). (10)
The optimization problem (P-1) reduces to two independent
optimization problems:
max
xL
{ ˆU(xL,θL)− (1− p)g(xL)− p ˆU(xL,θH)} (P-2a)
and
max
xH
{ ˆU(xH ,θH)− g(xH)}. (P-2b)
We will denote the solution to the two optimization problems
above by (xˆ∗i , tˆ∗i ) and for reasons that will become apparent in
the next paragraph we call it the second-best solution.
We now claim that the optimal contract satisfies xˆ∗L < xˆ∗H .
Indeed, consider the case when the utility company knows the
type of the consumer that it faces, i.e. the solution under full
information which we refer to as the first-best solution. We
denote the first-best solution by (xˆ†i , tˆ
†
i ) for i ∈ {L,H} where
the pair solves
max
xˆi
ˆU(xˆi,θi)− g(xˆi) (11)
and tˆ†i = ˆU(xˆ
†
i ,θi). Note that throughout the rest of the paper
we will use the notation (·)† to denote the first-best solution
and (·)∗ to denote the second-best solution.
Notice that (P-2b) is exactly the optimization problem
the utility company would solve to determine the first-best
solution for the high-type. Hence, even when there is hidden
information, the high-type will always be offered the first-best
quality and first-best price, i.e. (xˆ∗H , tˆ∗H) = (xˆ
†
H , tˆ
†
H). This is to
say that the high-type receives an efficient allocation.
Assumption 2 implies that the first-best solution xˆ†i (θ ) is
increasing in θ . Further, ˆU(xˆL,θH)− ˆU(xˆL,θL) is increasing in
xˆL and non-negative so that xˆ†L ≥ xˆ∗L. Thus xˆ∗L ≤ xˆ
†
L < xˆ
†
H = xˆ
∗
H .
This result also shows that when there is asymmetric
information, the low-type gets zero surplus and a quality level
that is inefficient when compared to the first-best solution.
On the other hand, as we have pointed out, the high-type is
offered the first-best quality and has more surplus. Further, the
high-type gets positive information rent:
tˆ∗H = tˆ
†
H −
(
ˆU(xˆ∗L,θH)− ˆU(xˆ∗L,θL)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
information rent
. (12)
We will see the effects of this in the example presented in
Section IV.
III. EFFECTS OF RISK ON PRIVACY CONTRACTS
In this section, we are interested in analyzing the effect of
loss risk (due to privacy breaches) in contracts.
Let us consider that users might suffer privacy breaches of
cost ℓ(θ ), with probability 1−η(x). Then, their expected profit
can be expressed as:
U(x,θ ) = ˆU(x,θ )− (1−η(x))ℓ(θ ). (13)
The characteristics of the privacy breach are summarized in
the following assumption.
Assumption 4. η : R→ [0,1] (probability of avoiding a pri-
vacy breach) is strictly increasing with respect to the privacy
x. The perceived loss due to a privacy breach ℓ : Θ→R≥0 is
increasing with respect to the type of each user.
Roughly speaking, the higher the privacy setting, the less
likely a privacy breach will occur. Furthermore, a user with
high privacy needs might experience smaller costs compared
to a user with low privacy settings.
The individual rationality constraints for the case where
consumers have privacy risks can be expressed as
ˆU(x,θ )− t ≥ (1−η(x))ℓ(θ ). (14)
Recall that the optimal contract without risk for the low-type,
(xˆ∗L, tˆ
∗
L), satisfies (IR-1) with strict equality, i.e. ˆU(xˆ∗L,θL) = tˆ∗L.
Thus, the optimal contract of the previous section violates (14)
unless either ℓ(θL) = 0 or η(xˆ∗L) = 1. Consequently, consumers
with low privacy preferences θL might do better by opting out.
On the other hand, the incentive compatibility constraint
(IC-2) can be expressed as
ˆU(xL,θL)− tL ≥ ˆU(xH ,θL)− tH +(η(xH)−η(xL))ℓ(θL) (15)
when we consider privacy risks. Note that since xˆ∗L < xˆ∗H ,
η(xˆ∗H)−η(xˆ∗L)> 0. Hence, the inequality in (15) might not be
satisfied by the optimal contract that does not consider risk.
Consequently, consumers with low preferences θL might want
to choose a high privacy contract.
Intuitively, the utility company might need to decrease the
cost tL and/or increase the privacy setting xL in order to
promote participation of consumers. These measures might
decrease the benefit and fees collected by the utility company.
Hence, there is an incentive for the utility company to purchase
insurance and/or invest in security.
4In the rest of this section, we characterize the contracts with
risk loss and the utility company’s profit.
A. Contracts with Loss Risk
Suppose that U defined in (13) satisfies Assumption 1.
Then the analysis in Section II holds when we replace ˆU
with U . Thus, we are going to compare the settings of
contracts with and without risk, denoted as {xL,xH , tL, tH}, and
{xˆL, xˆH , tˆL, tˆH}, respectively.
First, let us extract some inequalities that are going to be
used to compare the contracts. From (13) we can extract the
marginal utility with loss risk:
∂
∂xU(x,θ ) =
∂
∂x
ˆU(x,θ )+ ∂∂xη(x)ℓ(θ ). (16)
Since U is strictly increasing by Assumption 1, we have
∂
∂xU(x,θ )> 0. (17)
Furthermore, since ℓ(θ )≥ 0 and the probability of a successful
attack (1−η(x)) decreases with higher privacy settings, we
have ∂
∂xη(x)> 0. (18)
Hence, we can extract the following inequality from (16)
∂
∂xU(x,θH)≥
∂
∂x
ˆU(x,θH). (19)
From this inequality we can infer that the presence of risk
increases the valuation that each user gives to its privacy.
Now, we proceed to analyze changes in the optimal contract
with the inclusion of loss risk. First, let us show that the
privacy setting of a user with high-type is greater in presence
of risk.
Proposition 1. The privacy policy of an agent with type θH
is higher with loss risk, that is, x∗H ≥ xˆ∗H .
Proof. From (P-2a), we have the first-order conditions for the
case without risk,
∂
∂x
(
ˆU(x,θH)− g(x)
)∣∣∣
x=xˆ∗H
= 0, (20)
and the first-order conditions for the case with risk,
∂
∂x (U(x,θH)− g(x))
∣∣∣
x=x∗H
= 0. (21)
Thus (19) implies
0≥ ∂∂x
(
ˆU(x,θH)− g(x)
)∣∣∣
x=x∗H
. (22)
Note that ∂∂x
(
ˆU(x,θH)− g(x)
)
is a decreasing function of x.
Hence, the optimal privacy setting without risk xˆ∗H (which
satisfies (20)) must be smaller than the privacy setting with
risk, i.e., x∗H ≥ xˆ∗H . This result is independent of the population
distribution p and the low type θL.
Now, we analyze the privacy settings for consumers with
low-type.
Proposition 2. The privacy of low-type agents in contracts
with and without loss risk (x∗L and xˆ∗L resp.) satisfy the
following inequalities:ß
x∗L ≥ xˆ
∗
L, if p≤ p¯,
x∗L < xˆ
∗
L, if p > p¯, (23)
with p¯ = ℓ(θL)
ℓ(θH) .
Proof. From (P-2b) we get the first-order conditions for the
case without risk,
∂
∂x
(
ˆU(x,θL)− p ˆU(x,θH)
) ∣∣∣
x=xˆ∗L
− (1− p) ∂∂xg(x)
∣∣∣
x=xˆ∗L
= 0,
(24)
and the first-order conditions for the case with loss risk,
∂
∂x (U(x,θL)− pU(x,θH))
∣∣∣
x=x∗L
− (1− p) ∂∂xg(x)
∣∣∣
x=x∗L
= 0.
(25)
We use (13) to rewrite the first term of (25) as
∂
∂x (U(x,θL)− pU(x,θH)) =
∂
∂x
(
ˆU(x,θL)− p ˆU(x,θH)
)
+
∂
∂xη(x)(ℓ(θL)− pℓ(θH)) .
(26)
Now, let us consider three cases. First, if ℓ(θL)− pℓ(θH)= 0,
then, from (26) we know that the contracts with and without
risk have the same solution, that is, x∗L = xˆ∗L.
If ℓ(θL)− pℓ(θH)> 0, then
∂
∂x (U(x,θL)− pU(x,θH))>
∂
∂x
(
ˆU(x,θL)− p ˆU(x,θH)
)
.
(27)
Then (27) and (25) imply
0 > ∂∂x
Å
ˆU(x,θL)− p ˆU(x,θH)− (1− p)
∂
∂xg(x)
ã ∣∣∣∣∣
x=x∗L
. (28)
Hence, by (24), x∗L > xˆ∗L.
Finally, if ℓ(θL)− pℓ(θH)< 0, then
∂
∂x (U(x,θL)− pU(x,θH))<
∂
∂x
(
ˆU(x,θL)− p ˆU(x,θH)
)
.
(29)
In this case, we can use the first-order conditions in (24) and
(25) and the inequality (29) to prove that x∗L < xˆ∗L.
The following result generalizes the dependence of the
privacy xL with respect to p. In particular, the privacy of the
low-type users is decreasing with respect to p, regardless of
the presence of loss risk.
Proposition 3. The optimal privacy setting x∗L is decreasing
with respect to p.
Proof. First, let us consider two distribution probabilities
p, pˆ ∈ [0,1] such that pˆ = p+ ε , where ε > 0. Now, let us
define x∗L(p) as optimal privacy policy that satisfies the first-
order conditions in (25), for a population distribution p. Also,
let us consider the derivative of the objective function in (P-2b)
5for a population distribution pˆ:
∂
∂x f (x, pˆ) =
∂
∂x (U(x,θL)− pˆU(x,θH)− (1− pˆ)g(x)) , (30)
where f (x, pˆ) is the objective function of the optimization
problem. This can be rewritten as
∂
∂x f (x, pˆ) =
∂
∂x (U(x,θL)− pU(x,θH)− (1− p)g(x))
+ ε
∂
∂x (g(x)−U(x,θH)) . (31)
Evaluating the previous equation in x∗L(p) we find that
∂
∂x f (x
∗
L(p), pˆ) = ε
∂
∂x (g(x)−U(x,θH))
∣∣∣
x=x∗L(p)
. (32)
The previous result follows since x∗L(p) satisfies the first-order
conditions in (25).
Now, recall that the contract assigns higher privacy to agents
with high-type, i.e., x∗H > x∗L. Hence, if we evaluate the left-
hand side of (21) in x∗L(p), we find that
∂
∂x (U(x,θH)− g(x))
∣∣∣
x=x∗L(p)
> 0. (33)
Thus, we know that
∂
∂x f (x
∗
L(p), pˆ)< 0. (34)
This equation indicates that the the optimal contract with a
distribution pˆ satisfies x∗L(p)> x∗L(pˆ).
The previous result states that the optimal privacy for low-
type agents x∗L is decreasing with respect to the population
distribution p. Consequently, t∗L is also decreasing with p.
Furthermore, x∗H does not depend on p since the high-type
always gets an efficient allocation independent of the prior on
types. This applies regardless of the risk probability 1−η(x).
Another aspect of the contract that changes with the intro-
duction of risk is the cost t. Results in Propositions 1 and 2
let us determine the impact of risk on the price t paid by each
user.
Proposition 4. The price of the contracts with and without
risk ({t∗L, t∗H} and {tˆ∗L, tˆ∗H} respectively) satisfy the following
inequalities:

t∗L > tˆ
∗
L − (1−η(xˆ∗L))ℓ(θL), if p < p¯
t∗L < tˆ
∗
L, if p > p¯
t∗H > tˆ
∗
H , if p > p¯,1− 1−η(x
∗
H)
1−η(x∗L)
> p¯
(35)
with p¯ = ℓ(θL)ℓ(θH) .
Proof. From (10) we know that the contract payment is
t∗L =U(x∗L,θL). (36)
Since U(·,θ ) is an increasing function in x, we can use
Proposition 2 to conclude thatß
t∗L > tˆ
∗
L − (1−η(xˆ∗L))ℓ(θL), if p < p¯
t∗L < tˆ
∗
L, if p > p¯
(37)
On the other hand, the price paid by high-type users is given
by
t∗H =U(x∗H ,θH)−U(x∗L,θH)+U(x∗L,θL). (38)
Hence,
t∗H = ˆU(x∗H ,θH)− (1−η(x∗H))ℓ(θH)− ˆU(x∗L,θH)
+ (1−η(x∗L))ℓ(θH)+ ˆU(x∗L,θL)− (1−η(x∗L))ℓ(θL)
(39)
By assumption ˆU(·,θ ) is increasing in x so that ˆU(x∗H ,θH)>
ˆU(xˆ∗H ,θH) since x∗H > xˆ∗H for all p by Proposition 1. Further-
more, if we define
h(x) =−( ˆU(x,θH)− ˆU(x,θL)), (40)
then from Assumption 2 we know that h(·) is decreasing in x.
Hence, by Proposition 2, for p > p¯ we have x∗L < xˆ∗L so that
(39) becomes
t∗H > ˆU(xˆ∗H ,θH)− (1−η(x∗H))ℓ(θH)− ˆU(xˆ∗L,θH)
+ (1−η(x∗L))ℓ(θH)+ ˆU(xˆ∗L,θL)− (1−η(x∗L))ℓ(θL) (41)
= tˆ∗H +(η(x∗H)−η(x∗L))ℓ(θH)− (1−η(x∗L))ℓ(θL) (42)
By assumption 1− 1−η(x
∗
H )
1−η(x∗L)
> p¯, so that t∗H > tˆ∗H .
Proposition 5. If p > p¯, then the information rent under the
optimal contract without loss risk is higher than under the
optimal contract with loss risk, i.e.
ˆU(xˆ∗L,θH)− ˆU(xˆ∗L,θL)>U(x∗L,θH)−U(x∗L,θL). (43)
Proof. Suppose that p > p¯, then by Proposition 2 we have
x∗L < xˆ
∗
L. The information rent under {x∗L,x∗H , t∗L, t∗H} is given
by
U(x∗L,θH)−U(x∗L,θL) = ˆU(x∗L,θH)− ˆU(x∗L,θL)
+ (1−η(x∗L))(ℓ(θL)− ℓ(θH)). (44)
Since ℓ(θL)< ℓ(θH) by assumption, we have
U(x∗L,θH)−U(x∗L,θL)< ˆU(x∗L,θH)− ˆU(x∗L,θL) (45)
By Assumption 1, ˆU is increasing in x. Hence,
ˆU(x∗L,θH)− ˆU(x∗L,θL)< ˆU(xˆ∗L,θH)− ˆU(xˆ∗L,θL). (46)
Thus,
U(x∗L,θH)−U(x∗L,θL)< ˆU(xˆ∗L,θH)− ˆU(xˆ∗L,θL). (47)
We can conclude that when p< p¯, the loss risk increases the
privacy contract of all users. Roughly speaking, this happens
because losses of users with low-type are significant with
respect to losses of high-type users. In consequence, the
contract with loss risk allows users with low-type to have more
privacy. On the other hand, when p > p¯ losses of low-type
users are not significant and the contract will tend to offer
less privacy settings to low-type users. In this case the utility
company can afford more losses due to risk in order to collect
higher fidelity data.
We can conclude that, regardless of the profit, a popu-
lation of agents with p > p¯ might be more beneficial for
6a utility company interested in collecting information from
users. Roughly speaking, a favorable environment for privacy
contracts is characterized by a large population of agents
with high-type. In the next section we analyze the contract
parameters and the utility company’s profit as a function of
the population distribution p.
B. Profit
The profit of the utility company is
Π(tL,xL, tH ,xH) = (1− p)(−g(xL)+U(xL,θL))
+ p(−g(xH)+ tH) . (48)
Recall that xH does not depend on p and that tH is increasing
with respect to p. Hence, p(−g(xH)+ tH) is increasing in p.
Also, note that (25) can be rewritten as
∂
∂x (U(x,θL)− g(x))
∣∣∣
x=x∗L(p)
= p
∂
∂x (U(x,θH)− g(x))
∣∣∣
x=x∗L(p)(49)
From (33) we know that ∂∂x (U(x,θH)− g(x))
∣∣
x=x∗L(p)
. There-
fore, U(x∗L(p),θH)− g(x∗L(p)) is increasing in x∗L(p). Also,
because p ≥ 0, we know that U(x∗L(p),θL) − g(x∗L(p)) is
increasing in x. Considering that x∗L(p) is decreasing in p,
we can conclude that (1− p)(−g(x∗L(p)) +U(x∗L(p)),θL) is
decreasing in p.
Thus, Π is composed of an increasing term and a decreasing
term of p so that the maximum profit might be achieved on
the boundary, i.e. p = 0 or p = 1. We explore the profit of
the utility company in more detail through an example in the
following section.
IV. EXAMPLE – DIRECT LOAD CONTROL
Recall that the unit gain the utility company gets out of
the privacy setting x is a function g : X →R. In this section,
we discuss a particular example in which g is a metric for
how access to high-granularity data affects direct load control
(DLC).
In previous work, we characterized the utility–privacy trade-
off for a DLC problem of thermostatically controlled loads
(TCLs) [7]. In particular, we showed that the ℓ1–norm of the
error of the DLC (measured in terms of the ℓ1 distance between
the actual power consumed by the TCLs and the desired power
consumption) increases as a function of the sampling period,
i.e. distance between samples. Empirically the relationship
between sampling period and ℓ1–norm error is approximately
quadratic. Hence, for this example, we let
g(x) =
1
2
ζx2 (50)
where 0 < ζ < ∞.
Note that a decreased sampling rate corresponds to a higher
privacy setting. The function g as defined is increasing in x so
that g(xL)< g(xH).
Suppose that θ ∈ {θL,θH} where 0< θL < θH . Assume that
the consumer’s utility is given by
ˆU(x,θ ) = xθ (51)
where x ∈ [0,1], i.e. their utility is proportional to both the
type and quality. As in the previous section, we model the
consumer’s risk aversion using the following utility:
U(x,θ ) = ˆU(x,θ )− (1−η(x))ℓ(θ ) (52)
A higher privacy setting is less likely to be successfully
attacked; hence, for the sake of the example, we take 1−
η(x) = m(1− x) where m > 0 is a constant and x ∈ [0,1]
with zero corresponding to a low-privacy setting and one
corresponding to a high-privacy setting.
p0 p∗ 1
x
†
L
x∗L
x∗H = x
†
H
xθH−mℓ(θH)
ζ
θL−mℓ(θL)
ζ
xˆ∗L
xˆ
†
L
xˆ∗H = xˆ
†
H
pˆ∗
θL/ζ
θH/ζ
Fig. 1. Comparison between full information and asymmetric information
solutions as a function of p the probability of the high-type in the population
for both the case when we consider risk (gray) and when we do not consider
risk (black). The general shape of the curves stay the same for different values
of m; changing m from 0 to 1 only has an effect of shifting the critical value
p∗ for the case with risk closer to the origin as well as causing x∗H to decrease.
For the case without risk the first-best solution is given by
(xˆ†H , xˆ
†
H) =
ÅθH
ζ ,
θL
ζ
ã
and (tˆ†L, tˆ
†
H) =
Ç
θ 2H
ζ ,
θ 2L
ζ
å
. (53)
For the case with risk, the first-best solution is given by
(x†H ,x
†
L) =
ÅθH −mℓ(θH)
ζ ,
θL−mℓ(θL)
ζ
ã
(54)
and
(t†H , t
†
L) =
Ç
θ 2H −mθHℓ(θH)
ζ ,
θ 2L −mθLℓ(θL)
ζ
å
. (55)
Let the utility company’s prior be defined by p = P(θ = θH)
and (1− p) = P(θ = θL). Then the optimal solution to the
screening problem without risk is given by
(xˆ∗H , xˆ
∗
L) =
ÅθH
ζ ,
1
ζ
ï
θL−
p
1− p
(θH −θL)
ò
+
ã
(56)
where [·]+ = max{·,0}, i.e. xˆ∗L = 0 when p≥ pˆ∗, and
tˆ∗H =
θ 2H
ζ −
(θL−θH)
ζ
ï
θL−
p
1− p
(θH −θL)
ò
+
(57)
tˆ∗L =
θL
ζ
ï
θL−
p
1− p
(θH −θL)
ò
+
(58)
Similarly, the optimal solution to the screening problem
7when there is risk is given by
(x∗H ,x
∗
L) =
( 1
ζ (θH +mℓ(θH)),
1
ζ
[mℓ(θL)− pmℓ(θH)− pθH +θL
1− p
]
+
)
(59)
and
t∗H = t
∗
L + x
∗
HθH − x∗LθH +m(x∗H − x∗L)ℓ(θH) (60)
t∗L =
θL
ζ
[mℓ(θL)− pmℓ(θH)− pθH +θL
1− p
]
+
(61)
The plots in Figures 1-4 show the fundamental properties
of the contract solution and the general shapes of the curves
are invariant under changes to parameters of the problem.
p
t
θ 2H−mθHℓ(θH)ζ Info. Rent t
∗
H
p∗
t†L
t∗L
pˆ∗
tˆ†L
tˆ∗L
tˆ∗HInfo. Rent
θ 2Hζ
0 1
Fig. 2. Optimal prices as a function of p for both the case with risk (gray)
and without (black). The information rent as a function of p for both cases
is also shown.
p
Π
pˆ∗
θ 2L/(2ζ )
ˆΠ∗
ˆΠ†
p∗
θ 2L−ℓ
2(θL)m2
2ζ
Π†
Π∗
0 1
Fig. 3. Profit of the utility company as a function of p for both the case with
risk Π(p) (gray) and without ˆΠ(p) (black).
In Figure 1, we show that as the probability of the high-
type being drawn from the population increases, x∗L (resp. xˆ∗L)
decreases away from the optimal full information solution x†L
(resp. xˆ†L). This occurs until the critical point
p∗ =
θL +mℓ(θL)
θH +mℓ(θH)
Å
resp. pˆ∗ = θLθH
ã
. (62)
It is reasonable that as soon as the probability of the utility
company facing a consumer of high-type reaches a critical
p
W
ˆW ∗
ˆW †
θ 2H
2ζ
p∗ pˆ∗
W ∗
W †
10
θ 2H−ℓ
2(θH)m2
2ζ
Fig. 4. Social Welfare as a function of p for both the case with risk W ∗
(gray) and without risk ˆW ∗ (black).
point, they will focus all their efforts on this type of consumer
since a high-type desires a higher privacy setting which results
in a degradation of the DLC scheme.
In Figure 2, we show the optimal prices for the first-
and second-best problems in both the case with risk and
without. We see that for p ≤ p∗ (resp. p ≤ pˆ∗) we have
positive information rent for the high-type. Essentially, when
the probability of the existence of a low-type is large relative
to the probability of the existence of a high-type, there is a
positive externality on the high-type. Thus people who value
high privacy more need to be compensated more to participate
in the smart grid. Further, the low-type continues to get zero
surplus since the individual rationality constraint of the low-
type is always binding.
In Figure 3 and 4 respectively, we show the utility com-
pany’s expected profit and social welfare
W (p, tL,xL, tH ,xH) =Π(tL,xL, tH ,xH)+ p(U(xH,θH)− tH)
+ (1− p)(U(xL,θL)− tL), (63)
which is the sum of expected profit of the utility company
and the consumer. Notice the slope of the linear pieces of
ˆW ∗ and W ∗; in particular, ˆW ∗(p) for p≥ pˆ∗ is increasing at a
slower rate than W ∗(p) for p≥ p∗. Similarly, Π∗(p) for p≥ p∗
increases at a faster rate than ˆΠ∗(p) for p≥ pˆ∗. This is in part
due to the fact that t∗H(p)−t∗L(p)> tˆ∗H(p)− tˆ∗L(p) as is shown in
Figure 2. We remark that there are some values for p for which
the utility company’s profit and the social welfare are lower
when risk is considered; this motivates adding compensation
or insurance as a function of the population distribution into
the contract.
V. DISCUSSION
As the capability of smart meters to collect data at high
frequencies increases, we need to develop tools so that con-
sumers and utilities benefit from these advances. Implementing
privacy-aware data collection policies results in a reduction in
the fidelity of the data and hence, a reduction in the efficiency
of grid operations that depend on that data. This fundamental
tradeoff provides an incentive for the utility company to offer
new service contracts.
8In this paper we modeled electricity service as a product line
differentiated according to privacy. In this setting, consumers
can self-select the level of privacy that fits their needs and
wallet. We derived privacy contracts both when loss risks
are considered and when they are not. We characterized
the optimal solution in each of the cases and provided a
comparative study. We showed that loss risks decrease the
level service offered to each consumer type.
We remark that people who value high privacy more, need
to be compensated more to participate in the smart grid. If
there are two contracts, then even consumers who do not
value privacy much will have an incentive to lie. Through
the screening mechanism, the consumer will report their type
truthfully. The screening process is a way to do customer
segmentation, the result of which can lead to targeting. In
particular, using knowledge of consumer preferences, the util-
ity company could then incentivize consumers based on their
preferences to choose a low privacy setting thereby increasing
the granularity of data.
Further, we showed that the utility company has an incentive
to purchase insurance and invest in security when there are
loss risks. We leave the questions around how much the utility
company should invest in insurance versus security for future
work. There are a number of open questions in the design of
insurance contracts to be offered to the utility company by
a third party insurer given the consumer faces loss risk. We
have made initial efforts at studying insurance contracts to be
offered to the consumer [17]; however, there is much to be
done in understanding how the optimal contracts vary as a
function of the distribution of types and the privacy metric
used.
Other researchers have used contract theory for demand-side
management such as DLC and demand response programs.
Given that smart meters can collect data at high frequencies,
it would be interesting to consider the design of contracts
with multiple goods — e.g. privacy setting, DLC options —
in a multidimensional screening problem. In such a setting,
we may also model the consumer’s private information (type)
as multidimensional vector thereby increasing the practical
relevance of the model. Further, Assumption 2 is often referred
to as the sorting condition. One of the major difficulties in
extending to the multidimensional case is the lack of being
able to sort or compare across the different goods and their
qualities [16]; however, a potential solution is to create a
partial order of the multiple goods (benefits and privacy)
available to consumers.
In conclusion, there are multiple future research directions
we can explore from the model we have presented in this pa-
per. Our model provides a general a mathematical framework
for considering privacy as part of a service contract between
an electric utility and the consumer. This line of research can
help inform data collection schemes and privacy policy in the
smart grid.
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